Prompt corrective action provisions: are insurance companies and investment banks next? by Tatom, John / A.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Prompt corrective action provisions: are
insurance companies and investment
banks next?
John / A. Tatom
Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University
30. May 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9327/
MPRA Paper No. 9327, posted 29. June 2008 02:38 UTC
Prompt Corrective Action Provisions: Are Insurance Companies and 
Investment Banks Next?  
 
In 1991, Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA).  The Act aimed to recapitalize once and for all the depository insurance 
schemes for banks and savings and loan institutions.  It also provided for risk-based 
deposit insurance premiums, put explicit limits on the application of a “too big to fail” 
principle for banks and required that examiners implement “prompt corrective action” 
(PCA) standards for banks.  Essentially these steps were to improve the functioning of 
the FDIC, especially removing discretion of the examiners in the process of addressing 
the risk of failure of banks and providing explicit requirements of managing the 
deteriorating risk of failure and providing for rising insurance premiums for such banks.  
In particular, PCA established a set of capital benchmarks and required regulator actions 
that removed privileges for banks to manage their capital and payments of income to 
shareholders and bank creditors as the capital position of the bank deteriorated and the 
risk of failure rose.  In effect, regulators could take preemptive action to keep banks from 
depleting their capital as their capital positions deteriorate.   
 
These provisions have drawn increasing public attention in the past year for very 
different reasons.  First, Senate Bill 40, The National Insurance Act (NIA), which 
provides new opportunities for insurance companies to obtain their charters and to be 
regulated by a federal government entity instead of only the state governments, also 
requires that the new federal regulator develop and apply prompt corrective action 
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provisions to the supervision of federally chartered insurance companies.  The NIA 
allows insurance companies to have an “optional federal charter” (OFC), so that they may 
choose their regulator, keeping their charter and regulatory control by state government 
institution(s) or choosing the federal regulator.  In that sense, insurance would join banks, 
thrift institutions, and credit unions in having access to a dual chartering regime in which 
they could choose the level of government at which they wish to be regulated. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the NIA explicitly requires that the new federal regulator apply PCA to 
the insurance companies they regulate, just as federal bank regulators must apply PCA to 
banks.  
 
The second reason that these provisions have drawn attention recently is the near failure 
and sale of Bear Stearns.  The Federal Reserve helped arrange the sale of Bear Stearns in 
March 2008, with the sale to be completed shortly, to preempt its failure and consequent 
effects on other financial institutions.  At about the same time, the U.S. Department of 
Treasury released its long awaited “Blueprint for a Modernized Federal Financial 
Regulatory Structure” that calls for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System to have broad regulatory power over all financial institutions on issues related to 
financial market stability. These actions call attention to the absence of regulatory 
oversight powers by the Fed, in particular, enabling legislation that would allow the Fed 
to close investment banks or other failed or failing institutions in the same way that they 
can or must close such banks.  
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The near failure and subsequent nationalization of Northern Rock, a mid-sized bank in 
England, raised similar concerns as British regulators do not have the same closure 
abilities or mandates as exist in the United States, nor do they have PCA provisions that 
could have preempted the failure of Northern Rock.  
 
What is Prompt Corrective Action?  
Prompt corrective action (PCA) is a system of regulatory steps that can or must be taken 
if a bank’s capital falls short of certain prescribed benchmarks.  The aim is to increase 
pressure on a bank to take actions to insure that it will not fail because its capital gets too 
low to avoid bankruptcy.  PCA introduced a reliance on the Tier 1 leverage ratio, the ratio 
of Tier 1 capital to total assets, in classifying banks.  Ignoring risk-based capital 
requirements, the banks are classified as: 
•  “well capitalized,” if its ratio exceeds 5 percent, 
•  “adequately capitalized” if its ratio is 4 percent to 5 percent,  
•  “undercapitalized” if its leverage ratio is 3 percent to 4 percent,  
•  “significantly undercapitalized if its leverage ratio is 2 to 3 percent, and 
•  “critically undercapitalized” if its leverage ratio is below 2 percent.  
 
Tier 1 capital includes common stockholder equity, non-cumulative perpetual preferred 
stock and minority interests in the equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries.  
The leverage ratio criteria and PCA requirements supplement the risk-based capital 
requirements introduced by the Basel accords in 1988. Table 1 provides the broader 
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classification framework for PCA. See Spong (2000) or Benston and Kaufman (1997) for 
more detailed discussions of capital requirements and prompt corrective action. 
 
As a bank’s leverage ratio falls from well capitalized to lower levels, regulators impose 
restrictions on distributions of funds that can be used to boost capital and they can or 
must require more substantial actions.  For example, under PCA, issuing brokered 
deposits or underwriting securities are viewed as privileges that are removed if a bank 
falls to the adequately capitalized level.  If the capital ratio falls to the undercapitalized 
zone, the bank must develop and submit a capital restoration plan to regulators, it must 
restrict asset growth and it must secure regulatory approval before opening new branches 
or new lines of business.  When the leverage ratio falls further to the “severely 
undercapitalized” level, the bank cannot pay interest above its peer group average as 
determined by the regulator, and finally, when the leverage ratio falls below 2 percent, 
steps must be taken to close the bank.  Clearly, an effort is made to insure that banks do 
not close with any liability for the FDIC to cover insured deposits, though failures usually 
come quickly at the end and it is hard to keep a bank with a 2 percent ratio from 
deteriorating to negative equity in a very short period of time before it can be closed.   
 
Prompt corrective action’s reliance on the leverage ratio is a departure from the risk-
based capital standards adopted under Basel I, the international agreement on capital 
standards established in 1988 or updated in Basel II. Those capital standards attempt to 
attune the required capital held by banks to the risk of assets. They require the use, at 
least by large banks, of an internal ratings-based approach to assessing credit risk.  
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Reliance on a leverage ratio is regarded as crude by proponents of the Basel accords 
because the interpretation of a given leverage ratio is not adjusted for the risk of the total 
assets of the bank.  Thus a 5 percent ratio of capital to assets is huge if the assets are very 
safe government securities and is mush smaller relative to risk if all of a bank’s assets are 
commercial and industrial loans.  The major advantage of PCA is that the leverage ratio it 
introduced as a capital standard is simple and transparent to investors, customers and 
regulators alike, but it also has the advantage that it implies a generally higher level of 
capital than Basel I or Basel II risk-based capital requirements. Vaughan (2008) notes 
that Basel I was introduced at about the same time (implemented by the end of 1992) as 
prompt corrective action so that improved capital positions of banks may not have been 
due to PCA.  Gilbert (2006) has shown that most banks, especially large ones, are more 
constrained by the leverage ratio than they are by risk-based measures, so that being well-
capitalized usually requires a higher level of capital than risk-based measures alone.    
 
Risk-Based Capital Requirements  
Because of concerns over bank failure and differences in capital standards across the 
developed world, developed country central banks created the Basel Committee on 
Capital Standards in the 1980s.  This group developed the Basel I standards, grew into 
the Financial Stability Forum and developed Basel II standards.  Because of the capital 
losses credit crisis and financial sector failures in 2007-08, there is talk of a Basel III. The 
central idea of the Basel accords is to standardize capital requirements and to recognize 
the risk sensitivity of the appropriate amount of capital.  Basel requires two sets of 
requirements for Tier 1 capital and total capital, with both measured relative to risk-
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weighted assets.  The concept of risk-weighted assets is a measure of bank assets that 
accounts for the fact that some bank assets are very risky and that others are not. Thus 
standard assets such as commercial and industrial loans are the riskiest and have a weight 
of 100 percent, but other assets, such as loans to governments or their agencies or 
marketable government securities, are less risky in terms of the risks of default (credit 
risk) or market price fluctuations (market risk) so that these assets have less weight in 
measuring risky assets. The biggest problem with Basel I was that there were few risk 
categories for differently weighted assets and also banks found it easy to arbitrage the 
capital requirements by moving risky assets off the books or disguising them as safer 
assets while loading up on the safer assets on their balance sheets.  Banks were also able 
to use guarantees, collateral, netting arrangements and credit derivatives to alter the risk 
assessment of risky assets. Thus banks were able to game the system.   
 
Basel II attempted to provide more pillars for adequate capital standards.  It is based on 
the recognition that large international banks and some others had developed very good 
international rating systems that allowed them to have much better measurements and 
assessments of risk, as well as more sophisticated systems for controlling risk.  The banks 
own “internal ratings system” were judged to be more likely to reflect the appropriate risk 
weights for various bank assets and Basel II provided for banks to be able to use these 
weights instead of externally generated and imposed weights, though smaller banks were 
able to develop risk weighted asset measures based on such external measures. To protect 
against internal abuse, Basel II provided two other pillars to serve as checks on bank 
measures.  The second pillar is regulatory bank supervision which will review internal 
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methods and provide assessments of the internal methods, and the third pillar is market 
discipline, the external assessment of the bank’s risk by the marketplace, especially in 
pricing the bank’s stock and its marketable debt.  Basel II is just beginning to go into use 
in Europe and will do so in the United States in 2009.  Thus it is too early to assess how 
the new standards will work. The most important point is that Congress and regulators 
are unlikely to allow U.S. capital requirements to fall dramatically as a result of Basel II 
implementation, no matter how low risk-weighted assets are relative to total assets.  
 
The chart, taken from the Economist magazine of May 15, 2008 and based on Citigroup 
data, shows that European banks’ risk-based capital ratio have bordered on being 
adequately capitalized under the U.S. standard for risk-based Tier 1 capital from 2001-03. 
 
Chart 
European banks are poorly capitalized by U.S. PCA standards 
 
Source: “Cycle clips,” Economist Magazine, May 15, 2008 
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However, the leverage ratio shows that the average bank has been undercapitalized since 
2000 and the status has been deteriorating throughout the period.  In 2007 the ratio 
indicated that the average bank was significantly undercapitalized using the U.S. leverage 
ratio classification system for PCA.  
 
Table 1 shows how both standards are used in the United States to define how well 
capitalized a bank is; thus the average European bank would be classified as 
undercapitalized from 2000 to 2006 and significantly so in 2007, but this is not the case 
under risk-based measures.  Kaufman (2006) and Kane (2006) argue that PCA’s leverage 
ratio provides a more effective and simpler way to set prudential safety standards than 
Basel II or risk based measures generally.  Vaughan (2008), however, suggests that risk-
based capital requirements, at least as drawn up in model legislation used by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, provide an adequate substitute for prompt 
corrective action provisions.  The latter are called for in the National Insurance Act.  
Risk-based capital measures in banking and insurance were developed to provide a higher 
prudential standard of capital management to avoid failure. But Basel requirements, in 
the absence of PCA, do not impose mandatory restrictions on regulators and, in the case 
of insurance, it is optional for state regulators to adopt and also optional for the 
provisions to be implemented. More importantly, it is a guideline for classification with 
no direct teeth for enforcement or motivation. 
 
In the case of insurance, required reporting is annual, while it is quarterly for banks. 
Since capital can be depleted quickly at the end of the life of a failing institution, more 
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frequent monitoring is vital.  As Vaughan (2008, p.8) notes, what she refers to as 
insurance PCA “is less specific about the nature of regulatory action that must be taken 
and does not contain specific limitations on insurer activities at different capital levels.”  
Most important, banks find value in being “well capitalized”; PCA requirements for this 
classification are more difficult and costly to achieve and usually force institutions to 
maintain a higher overall capital cushion than do the risk-based requirements [see Gilbert 
(2006)]. In turn this has meant that U.S. banks have been more immune to failure since 
the adoption of PCA. 
 
Well capitalized banks benefit by having higher stock market valuations for given 
earnings, a lower cost of capital and a higher capital cushion when there are credit losses 
and earnings shocks, as they have had since mid-2007.  While increased bank failures are 
expected from recent credit market events, the numbers are expected to be smaller 
because of higher capital ratios going into the crisis. Most banks today are well 
capitalized and hold higher capital than they would without PCA standards. These higher 
ratios are also making raising new capital easier and less costly.  
 
Prospects for Other Financial Institutions 
Setting federal standards for capital requirements at investment banks and insurance 
companies is on the horizon.  Fed interest in the stability of investment banks and perhaps 
even hedge funds is a likely result of expanded federal regulatory powers of the Fed and 
their perceived interest in the financial viability of these firms. Similarly federal 
regulatory provision of prompt corrective action standards for nationally chartered 
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insurance companies is likely if the National Insurance Act creates a federal role in 
chartering and regulation of insurance companies.  Not only will both efforts require new 
capital requirement standards, but some coordination with existing or new schemes for 
insurance of firms’ liabilities will be necessary.  In addition new statutes or rules for 
closure, merger or liquidation will be necessary to minimize the exposure of insurance 
funds, whether federal or not, to failure of these institutions.     
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Table 1 
Criteria for Classifying Banks as Adequately and Well Capitalized 
 
  
Risk-based capital ratios 
 
PCA measure 
Capital 
Classification 
Total capital 
as a  
percentage 
of risk-
weighted 
assets 
  
  Tier 1 capital 
as a 
percentage of 
risk-weighted 
assets 
  Leverage 
ratio (Tier 1
capital/ 
total assets)
Well capitalized 10 percent or 
greater 
AND 6 percent or 
greater 
AND 5 percent or 
greater 
Adequately 
capitalized 
8 percent or 
greater 
AND 4 percent or 
greater 
AND 4 percent or 
greater 
Undercapitalized Less than 8 
percent 
OR Less than 4 
percent 
OR 3 percent to 
4 percent 
Significantly 
undercapitalized 
Less than 6 
percent 
OR Less than 3 
percent 
OR Less than 3 
percent 
Critically 
undercapitalized 
NA  NA  Less than 2 
percent* 
 
A well capitalized bank must also be free of any directive from its supervisor to maintain 
a specific capital level. 
*Ratio of tangible capital to total assets.  
Source: Gilbert (2006) and Spong (2000). 
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